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Abstract: Aesthetic responsivity and the phenomenology of arts processes reflect
integrative self-world engagements, and are informative about the nature of the
world and our biology in ways that are often not be made evident through sci-
entific research. Akins’ and Hahn’s research regarding human trichromatic visual
perception brings together the art of photography, neuroscience, and psychophysics,
along with analyses of perspectives on vision in science and philosophy, to invoke
anti-reductive, holistic understandings of how we see colour. We bring aesthet-
ics and the phenomenology of arts processes to bear in exploring creaturely re-
sponsivity to the complex inter-relational dynamics of light perception, and offer
reflective metaphors for human engagements that challenge Darwinian utilitarian
conceptions. We argue that attending to aesthetic and phenomenological aspects
of experiences is essential to understanding how the shared circuits of cognition
and sensory-motor engagement shape our perceptive responsive interactions.
The complex behaviour of light in the environment and how that interacts
with human actions and perceptions have generated conflicting understand-
ings of the what and how questions about colour and our engagements with it.
Empirical approaches in science and philosophy tend to work in a reductionist
manner and can therefore exclude knowledge from other disciplines and lived
responsive engagement. In the case of human sensory experiencing, this can
produce an unbalanced and inaccurate picture. Aesthetic responsivity and the
phenomenology of arts processes reflect integrative self-world engagements,
c© Aesthetic Investigations Vol 2, No 1 (2018), 104-112
Suzanne Noel-Bentley
Grant Gillett
and are informative about the nature of the world and our biology in ways
that may not be made evident through a positivist approach to scientific re-
search. In ‘More than Mere Colouring: The Role of Spectral Information
in Human Vision’(2014) and their chapter ‘Colour Perception’(2015), new
understandings offered by Kathleen Akins and Martin Hahn show up how
reductive methodologies have contributed to researchers’ blindspots about
the holistic, phenomenological, qualitative or aesthetic aspects of experiences
they study. Akins’ and Hahn’s research and results suggest to us that anal-
yses of cognitive and perceptual capacities should acknowledge the holism of
human cognition in a way that goes beyond the terms that usually constrain
biological inquiry.
Akins and Hahn looked critically at a wide spectrum of ideas and research
about light, colour and vision, and used the art of photography to clarify un-
derstanding of human trichromatic visual perception. Their view of colour
perception not only takes a fuller account of contemporary research in neu-
roscience, but also clarifies how theories of colour ontology, from Aristotle’s
to those generated by contemporary psychophysics, have shaped and directed
the focus of scientific research and thought about visual perception. Their re-
search is an example of how multidimensional perspectives which include arts
processes generate new and informative interpretations of, and metaphors for,
human experience in the world.
We will explore two trains of thought:
- the background assumptions of social/functional Darwinism can narrow
research perspectives and understandings of creaturely engagement in the
world;
- understandings of human cognitive and sensory experiencing are enriched
through the interplay of arts phenomenology, aesthetic sensibilities, and the
sciences.
Akins and Hahn challenged some of the stereotypical utilitarian Darwinian
tenets about the instigation for evolutionary change. Competition for food,
mates, and the survival of one’s genetic material are often recited rote by
scientists as the functional determinants of biology and human behaviour.
Phenomenological research suggests that creativity and responsive loving en-
gagement with others are significant survival imperatives for social creatures.
The phenomenology of arts engagements and the dimensions of aesthetic ap-
preciation, and their central place in human cultures, support an assumption
that pleasure in multimodal and somatosensory experience are also reasons
for capacities to develop in the evolutionary continuum.
The foundations of our aesthetic sense-abilities are in our creaturely sen-
sorimotor responsiveness and our intuitive responsivity to qualities of things
with which we engage. The ‘sense’ of something takes account of the intricate
interrelational dynamics of our experience. The meanings and judgements we
make about qualities that inhere in ‘things’ are responsive to the proportion-
ing of intrinsic elements as we perceive them. The interpretation of ‘natural
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selection’, that all characteristics and behaviours evolve from and are reflec-
tive of selfish survival and propagation needs, is often tempered for humans
with an argument for altruism as being useful based on our social natures.
But the paradigm doesn’t really fit with the complexity of our responses to
aesthetic qualities or the integrative multidimensionality of our neural net-
works in which sensorimotor processes are integral with ‘higher functions’.1
The communicative expressions of artistic endeavours generate empathy and
shared responsiveness, and the pleasure we experience in creative engagement
with each other and the material world isn’t inevitably machiavellian.
The ‘survival of the fittest’ paradigm is more easily applied to the be-
haviour of animals because they can’t argue back about human interpreta-
tions of their experience. As aesthetic responsivity is grounded in our en-
vironmental interactions, there is no reason to assume that humans are the
only creatures who take pleasure in sensory experiences. That this writer has
observed in her cat a love of organised sound might be explained by her cat’s
cognitive development in a musician’s household. Whenever the cat heard the
cello or piano, she would come running and find an ideal position in which
to lounge about basking in the flow of organised sound waves. She also had
an excellent ear for intonation, and would stop twitching her ears and start
purring when the cello’s strings where perfectly tuned—understandable as the
Western musical system is based on natural harmonic resonances. These re-
sponses evinced the attunement of the cat to a world of music and mine to my
cat, rather than a strategic function related to her conventionally understood
survival or propagation needs.
The cat never showed any interest in the paintings on the wall, but after
all cats don’t have the human sort of trichromatic colour discrimination, and
the static nature of paintings plausibly make them irrelevant or incidental
configurations of visual properties in a cat world. The visual sense in humans
is highly complex and integrated in cognitive function, and it provides ex-
pansive depth of field and contrast capacities that allow us to assess a scene
and the options for action from a useful distance. These factors sometimes
make vision seem to be the dominant sense in our environmental assessments,
but all of the senses, our cognitive schemas, and our imaginative capacities
are integrated in the neural processing of our multi-sensorimotor engagement
with the world. Because of this paintings are evocative objects of interest.
The interactive complexity of our visual perception means that colour vision
in humans for seeing, in the innumerable ways that shape and enhance our
experiences in the world, makes more holistic sense than colour for colour
discrimination primarily as a function for identifying ripe fruits, healthy veg-
etables, and blushingly nubile young women. These Darwinian explanatory
stereotypes were mentioned by Akins and Hahn as commonly cited by nu-
merous researchers.2
Akins and Hahn offered a well researched and useful perspective on the
flow of evolutionary change in terrestrial vertebrate vision:
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- from the complexity of colour perception in our common tetrachromat an-
cestors from 400 million years ago—with the potential capacity for complex
wavelength discrimination from the combinations of four cones and coloured
oil droplets as colour filters;
- to convergent simplification that exploits contrast for discernment—through
luminosity perception by rods that favours the intensity of stimulus to pho-
toreceptors and the pooling of wavelength information;
- to the divergence of capacities—rods responsive to luminosity and three
types of cones favouring differential wavelength discrimination, which are
then neurally harmonised in complex ways to provide both functional and
fine-grained, rich and subtle aesthetic relationships with the environment.
The concept ‘harmony’ is used here, as it was in ancient Greek understand-
ing, as the bringing of unlike elements into relationship so as to create new
and richer orders of experience and understanding.
To comprehend the nature of ‘colour’, and our engagements with it and
theories about it, it is useful to consider that colours in substances demon-
strate different properties than the colours of light that we see through our
contact with particular wavelengths within the visible spectrum. Colours are
not properties of objects per se, but rather of the light that is absorbed by or
reflected from them, in other words, ‘. . . the causes of colour experiences do
not resemble the colours as they appear to us in perception’.3 Seeing a banana
as ‘yellow’ is an interpretive description of my perception of the light that is
absorbed and reflected by a banana and bounced around the environment
with which I am engaged. That interpretation links the banana to aspects of
my experiences of being immersed in a scene suffused by light—where I am
alive and responsive to the world.
How light is absorbed and reflected by objects and surfaces allows certain
wavelengths (and intensities) to impact on eyes and their associated neural
pathways. The visual system of a person therefore responds differently to
light than substances do. When dyes, pigments and substances absorb cer-
tain wavelengths, they subtract those ‘colours’ from the reflected light that we
see. When light impacts on our retinas, we mix and interpret the responses
of the rods and cones to wavelengths, luminosities and polarities simultane-
ously, at the same time that we are also combining other multiple sources of
information. This happens not only as a function of eye and brain, but also
as part of a whole extended person/environment system of interaction and
historical experiencing, and the available qualities of touch contact with the
world’s ambient possibilities for sensory interplay. In my experience, a ba-
nana is yellow, it also comes in a bunch, grows on a tree, and is a fruit that I
eat with a certain taste that is different when it is yellow from what it is when
green. Yellowness in that case is a property of my experience with the world
that includes the banana, light and the dynamics of my visual perceptive
capacity at a particular time and place. It also implicates memory, imagi-
nation and language, all aspects of my organismic and aesthetic engagement
107
Philosophy and Aesthetics Inform Science
with a ‘banana situation’ full of human possibilities. The concept yellow is
a reference to interactions situated in the environment within which I define,
indwell, and enjoy my experience. Colour is a quality of experience not a
thing, it is a property of relationships between unlike things, a harmony of
engagement, and it resonates with cues and echoes of the whole of which it
is a part.
Akins and Hahn argue effectively that colour is an integral and essen-
tial element for seeing all in, not simply for colour discrimination. They
brought together neuroscience and psychophysics with the art of photogra-
phy to clarify the interactions of wavelength, luminosity, and polarity with
the human visual system. Of particular interest here are the results of their
photographic experiments which demonstrated that: contrast—an artefact
of visual processing—is key to perceiving and defining objects, boundaries,
shadows and dimensionality; and importantly, shadows contribute spatial,
dimensional, and boundary definition information in interaction with both lu-
minosity and colour. Significantly, whereas previously shadow discernment
was generally assumed to be dependent on luminosity contrasts alone, their
analysis demonstrates that shadows are disambiguated through the holistic
integration of wavelength and luminosity perceptions. All of those elements
contribute to our (embodied, concerned) interpretations of experiences in the
environment.4
In simplistic biological terms, humans experience visual stimuli through
comparisons and syntheses made possible by the diversity, commonalities and
complexities of photoreceptors’ responsivity in interaction with the whole
nervous system. Humans also interpret and make meanings from visual ex-
perience, they see, through the holism of sensory engagement that includes:
current contextual visual perception; present and past psychosocial, propo-
sitional, and environmentally-situated sensorimotor action; and aesthetic re-
sponsivity.
It is clear that reductive foci in scientistic methodologies or perspectives
can cause researchers to misunderstand the parts and the whole of the big
picture. With regard to visual perception, it is the complexity and interfusion
of differences that generates experience, reflection, and sensually meaningful
and pleasurable comprehension. And part of our psychosocial world is a
whole range of symbols and icons that resonate with us at many levels of our
psychology. The phenomenology of aesthetic experience and shared artistic
expressions are therefore deeply ingrained at levels of our neural networks
that grip and move us. Thus human life is only partially illuminated by a
blinkered view of what is of use to us (in some constrained understanding of
use).
There is a different field of human endeavour that involves generations of
observers who, through their direct experience with substances in the world,
have engaged in reflective analysis and experimentation leading to the devel-
opment of theories and practical applications, including ongoing peer review
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and critical assessment in statistically significant and diverse populations.
They have created innumerable models representing colour, intensity, light
and shadow, and the interplay of those elements, as well as those elements’
production of and effects on object and spatial-dimensional discrimination in
all sorts of environmental and psychosocial conditions. So—ask any painter
if luminosity, colour, and shadow are discrete elements in visual perception.
I asked the artist Julie Emerson, who said when she paints a red apple, for
example, she must: consider the core shadow on the apple itself and within
that dark shadow, the reflected light from the yellow wall beside it, then the
occlusion shadow on the blue tablecloth directly beneath the apple, which
extends out on the creased surface of the tablecloth the bumpy oval cast
shadow, containing not only that blue but also the red of the apple and its
complementary colour, green, as projected by the human visual system.
Akins’ and Hahn’s photographic studies demonstrated that shadows are
the result and expression of the intermingling of all elements in visual process-
ing. This is something that artists get and many scientists did not. Perhaps
scientists did not partly because their way of seeing colour was to see it as a
something that inhered in things and which would then be represented and
deciphered or detected as a colour ‘thing’ (or category of stimulation directly
related to an external property) in the brain. Rather than colour as existent
in objects, we can understand that colour is a summation of the movement,
absorption and reflection of light, as interpreted through a neural network
shaped by situated relational experiences. Also, in the twentieth century, per-
ception was understood for a time in physicalist, mechanistic or behaviourist
terms as things acting-on reactive responders-to who are causally oriented to-
wards somewhat limited (and therefore scientifically tractable) goals. In those
sorts of paradigms there are discretely defined objects with fixed natures and
trajectories that have a survival related effect on us. A view influenced by
quantum science sees human beings as observers who interact with the world
such that perception is an holistic process of human-world intra-active en-
gagement. The aesthetics of engaging with colour and light, and the sensory
appreciation of light, inform our understandings of colour.
Interdisciplinary studies bring the methodologies and results of different
disciplines together in useful ways, and often ways in which clear-cut func-
tional simplifications elude us. Many contemporary philosophers are inter-
ested in neuroscience within an interdisciplinary inquiry, perhaps because
‘the brain is the zone of intersection where matter meets mind: subjectivity,
consciousness, agency—or whatever else supposedly constitutes the core of
“the human”’.5 What Akins and Hahn refer to as the colour for colour mind
set has a long and complex history that involves systems of philosophical
and scientific belief that tend to exclude the continual practical and creative
experiential meaning-making that underlies artistic pursuits and aesthetic ap-
preciation. However, there is a philosophical conception compatible with an
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holistic perspective, and it can be found in Aristotle’s insights gained through
observations of the natural world and human actions.
Aristotle’s reasoned intuitions about substances of transmission and re-
sponsivity make sense in application to light as a medium of interaction for
our experiences of colour. These often referenced sections of De Anima clar-
ify Aristotle’s experientially grounded phenomenological insights (philosopher
Eugene Gendlin’s translation, parentheses and bold are Gendlin’s):
Universally (“katholou”), with regard to all sense-perception, we
must take it that the sense is that which can receive perceptible
forms without their matter, as wax receives the imprint of the ring
without the iron or gold,6
For the instrument which perceives must be a particular ex-
tended magnitude, while what it is to be able to perceive and
the sense is surely not a magnitude but rather a certain pro-
portion (logos) and potentiality of that thing.7
Here is our interpretation, in concert with Gendlin, using musical metaphor
and referencing cognitive neuroscience:8
i. That which perceives is like an instrument.
ii. A sense is the ability to perceive, the capacity to respond to the perceptible.
The tuning proportions the pitches of the strings such that the instrument
can be played and music as responsive meaning can be generated. The tuning
of the instrument creates a ratio of relationships and a range of responsive
capacity, just as an holistically integrated perceptual system proportions the
weighting of inputs from sensory neurones according to their contribution to
the organism’s adaptation to the situations in which it has lived and devel-
oped the ability to perceive.
iii. The perceptible engages with the instrument by affecting its proportioned
capacity. The way in which that capacity responds defines the perceptible,
within the instrument and in expression as communication.
The complex interrelational dynamics of light in the world and the mul-
tiple dimensions of our creaturely responsivity to those dynamics provide
metaphors for human being-in-the-world that are different from those pro-
vided by the reductive functional abstraction that is social Darwinism. This
can be appreciated not only in terms of biological functions, but also through
the intra- and interactions of perceptual systems that inform the delibera-
tive activity of environmentally embedded social beings. After all, what do
we and other creatures do but learn our way through living processes and
environmental responsivity, integrating experience, tuning and attuning our
capacities in responsive engagement, and sharing capacities and knowledge as
we go? Our aesthetic responsivity grounds our capacity to comprehend the
coordinations of interconnections in the world as rich holisms, and the dy-
namics of our brain structure and function reflects those processes. Aesthetic
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appreciation is an holistic response to the nature of our creaturely human ex-
istence. Holistically integrative learning processes, meaning-making, creative
actions and expressive arts are human evolutionary imperatives for autopoi-
etic social creatures such as we are.
Colour is an experience of the properties and actions of light in rela-
tionship to elements of the environment and the historically and holistically
shaped perceptual capacities of creatures who live, move and play in that
environment as part of it. Identifying ‘colours’ as concepts that delineate and
circumscribe our visual experiences is an articulation of our interpretation of
the complexities and responsivity of our presence in and engagement with
the world so that it becomes thinkable. Western scientific thought operates
with categories that pigeonhole an inherently dynamic state of being into
things, events, and processes (organised and tendentious series of conceptu-
ally reified events). Akins’ and Hahn’s work illuminates ways in which the
intersections of science, philosophy, the arts, and ‘real life’ engagements can
be influential in and mutually informative about how we make sense of the
world and our experiences. In artistic endeavours, people study, comprehend,
express and communicate, play with and enjoy through sensorimotor inter-
and intra-action, aspects of the world and our engagements with them. They
do this through the creation of art objects and shared sensory experiences
which are not primarily functional, and this brings us into resonant focused
contact with the nature of being-in-the-world.
suzanne.noel-bentley@otago.ac.nz
grant.gillett@otago.ac.nz
NOTES
1. ‘John Hughlings Jackson was a pioneer
in neurology who thought deeply about
the structure of the brain . . . He enunci-
ated a theory of the evolution and dis-
solution of neural function based on the
idea that basic sensorimotor processes be-
come embedded in networks of connec-
tions that relate them in successively more
complex ways to allow for performance
of more and more nuanced and adaptive
functions . . . Consistent with the frame-
work offered by Hughlings Jackson, recent
research on embodied cognition empha-
sizes pre-existing sensorimotor function as
the basis of higher order cognitive (i.e.
conceptual) processes which underlie our
complex actions’ Franz and Gillett 2011,
3114, 3116).
2. Akins and Hahn 2014, 126,127.
3. Akins and Hahn 2015, 426.
4. ‘A light wave also gives information about:
. . . its direction of propagation and veloc-
ity. So when sunlight is reflected, re-
fracted, absorbed, filtered, and scattered
by the various media and surfaces within
an environment, each of these dimensions
is affected in profoundly complex yet law-
like ways. The laws of optics, and the
laws of physics below the level of optics,
apply to all three dimensions, with dif-
ferent effects upon different dimensions.
Thus, each dimension of light carries the
potential for information about its causal
history, the media through which it was
transmitted, the surfaces from which it
was reflected or by which it was absorbed,
and so on. The multiple dimensions of
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light embody both dependent and inde-
pendent sources of information about the
distal world.’ Akins and Hahn 2014, 138).
5. Slaby 2015, 16.
6. 424a17-20, Aristotle, in Gendlin 2012, 197.
7. 424a26-28, Aristotle, in Gendlin 2012, 199.
8. Gendlin 2012, 194-202.
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